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Abstract
Technology is increasingly used — unintentionally (mis-
information) or intentionally (disinformation) — to spread
false information at scale, with potentially broad-reaching
societal effects. For example, technology enables increas-
ingly realistic false images and videos, and hyper-personal
targeting means different people may see different versions
of reality. This report is the culmination of a PhD-level spe-
cial topics course1 in Computer Science & Engineering at
the University of Washington’s Paul G. Allen School in the
fall of 2018. The goals of this course were to study (1) how
technologies and today’s technical platforms enable and sup-
port the creation and spread of such mis- and disinformation,
as well as (2) how technical approaches could be used to mit-
igate these issues. In this report, we summarize the space of
technology-enabled mis- and disinformation based on our in-
vestigations, and then surface our lessons and recommenda-
tions for technologists, researchers, platform designers, pol-
icymakers, and users.
1 Introduction
Misinformation is false information that is shared with no in-
tention of harm. Disinformation, on the other hand, is false
information that is shared with the intention of deceiving the
consumer [49, 110]. This phenomenon, also referred to as
information pollution [110] or false or fake news [54], is a
critical and current issue. Though propaganda, rumors, mis-
leading reporting, and similar issues are age-old, our current
technological era allows these types of content to be created
easily and realistically, and to spread with unprecedented
speed and scale. The consequences are serious and far-
reaching, including potential effects on the 2016 U.S. elec-
tion [33], distrust in vaccinations [9], murders in India [16],
and impacts on the lives of individuals [50].
1https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse599b/
18au/
In this report, which is the culmination of a PhD-level spe-
cial topics course1 in Computer Science & Engineering at the
University of Washington’s Paul G. Allen School in the fall
of 2018, we consider the phenomenon of mis/disinformation
from the perspective of computer science. The overall space
is complicated and will require study from, and collabora-
tions among, researchers from many different areas, includ-
ing cognitive science, economics, neuroscience, political sci-
ence, psychology, public health, and sociology, just to name
a few. As technologists, we focused in the course, and thus in
this report, on the technology. We ask(ed): what is the role of
technology in the recent plague of mis- and disinformation?
How have technologies and technical platforms enabled and
supported the spread of this kind of content? And, critically,
how can technical approaches be used to mitigate these is-
sues — or how do they fall short?
In Section 2, we summarize the state of technology in
the mis/disinformation space, including reflecting on what
is new and different from prior information pollution cam-
paigns (Section 2.1), surveying work that studies current
mis/disinformation ecosystems (Section 2.2), and summariz-
ing the underlying enabling technologies (specifically, false
video, targeting and tracking, and bots, in Section 2.3), as
well as existing efforts to curb the effectiveness or spread
of mis/disinformation (Section 2.4). We then step back to
summarize the lessons we learned from our exploration (Sec-
tion 3.1) and then make recommendations particularly for
technologists, researchers, and technical platform designers,
as well as for policymakers and users (Section 3.2).
Our overarching conclusions are two-fold. First, as tech-
nologists, we must be conscious of the potential negative im-
pacts of the technologies we create, recognize that their de-
signs are not neutral, and take responsibility for understand-
ing and minimizing their potential harms. Second, however,
the (causes and) solutions to mis/disinformation are not just
based in technology. For example, we cannot just “throw
some machine learning at the problem”. In addition to de-
signing technical defenses — or designing technology to at-
tempt to avoid the problem in the first place — we must also
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work together with experts in other fields to make progress
in a space where there do not seem to be easy answers.
2 Understanding Mis- and Disinformation
A key goal of this report is to provide an overview of
technology-enabled mis/disinformation — what is new, what
is happening, how technology enables it, and how tech-
nology may be able to defend against it — which we do
in this section. Others have also written related and valu-
able summaries that contributed to our understanding of the
space and that we recommend the interested reader cross-
reference [49, 54, 63, 110].
2.1 What Is New?
While propaganda and its ilk are not a new problem, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the rise of technology has
served to catalyze the creation, dissemination, and consump-
tion of mis/disinformation at scale. Here we briefly detail,
from a technology standpoint, the major factors that have
contributed to our current situation:
1. Democratization of content creation. Anyone can
start a website, blog, Facebook page, Twitter account,
or similar and begin creating and sharing content. There
has been a transformation from a highly centralized sys-
tem with a few major content producers to a decentral-
ized system with many content producers. This flood
of information makes it difficult to distinguish between
true and false information (i.e., information pollution).
Additionally, tools to create realistic fake content have
become available to non-technical actors (e.g., Deep-
Fakes [10, 48]), significantly lowering the barrier to en-
try in terms of time and resources for people to create
extremely realistic fake content.
2. Rapid news cycle and economic incentives. The more
clicks a story gets, the more money gets made through
ad revenue. Given the rapid news cycle and plethora of
information sources, getting more clicks requires pro-
ducing content that catches consumers’ attention — for
instance, by appealing to their emotions [74] or playing
into their other cognitive biases [6, 89]. In addition, so-
cial media platforms that provide free accounts to users
make money via targeted advertising. This allows a va-
riety of entities, with intentions ranging from helpful to
harmful, to get their messages in front of users.
3. Wide and immediate reach and interactivity. Con-
tent created on one side of the planet can be viewed
on the other side of the planet nearly instantaneously.
Moreover, these content creators receive immediate
feedback on how their campaigns are performing — and
can easily iterate and A/B test — based on the number
of likes, shares, clicks, comments, and other reactions
on social media. Contrast the six long years that it took
for the Russian disinformation campaign about AIDS
having been created by the U.S. to take off in the 1980s
[7, 20] with the viral spread of false stories like Pizza-
gate [5] during the 2016 U.S. election.
4. Organic and intentionally created filter bubbles. In
today’s web experience, individuals get to choose what
content they do or do not want to see, e.g., by customiz-
ing their social media feeds or visiting specific websites
for news. The resulting echo chambers are often called
“filter bubbles” [72] and can help mis/disinformation
spread to receptive people who consume it within a lim-
ited broader context. Though some recent studies sug-
gest that filter bubbles may not be as extreme as feared
(e.g., [39]), others find evidence for increased polariza-
tion [62]. Moreover, cognitive biases like the backfire
effect (discussed below) suggest that exposure to alter-
nate views is not necessarily effective in helping people
change their minds. Worse, entities wishing to spread
disinformation can intentionally create filter bubbles by
directly and accurately targeting (e.g., via ads or spon-
sored posts) potentially vulnerable individuals.
5. Algorithmic curation and lack of transparency. Con-
tent curation algorithms have become increasing com-
plex and fine-tuned — e.g., the algorithm that deter-
mines which posts, in what order, are displayed in a
user’s Facebook news feed, or YouTube’s recommender
algorithms, which have been frequently criticized for
pushing people towards more extreme content [102]. At
the same time, these algorithms are not transparent for
end users (e.g., Facebook’s ad explanation feature [3]).
This complexity can make it challenging for users to
understand why they are having specific viewing expe-
riences online, what the real source of information (e.g.,
sponsored content) is [64], and even that they are hav-
ing different experiences from other users.
6. Scale and anonymity in online accounts. Actors
wishing to spread disinformation can leverage the weak
identity and account management frameworks of many
online platforms to create a large number of accounts
(“sybils” or bots) in order to, for example, pose as le-
gitimate members of a political movement and/or arti-
ficially create the impression that particular content is
popular (e.g., [4]). It is not clear how to address this
issue, as stricter account verification can have negative
consequences for some legitimate users [43], and bot
accounts can have legitimate purposes [36, 82].
What has not changed: Cognitive biases of human con-
sumers. Though the above technology trends have con-
tributed to creating the currently thriving mis/disinformation
ecosystem, ultimately, the content that is effective relies on
something that has not changed: the cognitive biases of hu-
man consumers [6, 89]. A prescient article from 2002 [14]
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discussed how these cognitive biases can be exploited via
technology, and such strategies are common in market-
ing [89] and traditional propaganda. A common such bias
is “confirmation bias”, by which people pay more attention
and lend more credence to information that confirms some-
thing they are already inclined to believe. Another example
that will recur in this report is the “backfire effect”, which
suggests that when confronted with facts intended to change
a person’s opinion or belief about something, this confronta-
tion can have the opposite effect, causing people to more
strongly hold their original belief [59, 70]. A full survey of
these exploitable human cognitive “vulnerabilities”, though
outside the scope of this report, is an important component
of understanding why mis/disinformation campaigns are ef-
fective and how (not) to combat them.
2.2 Measuring the Problem
We begin by surveying work that has studied today’s mis/
disinformation ecosystems directly, attempting to quantita-
tively and qualitatively understand the problem. Understand-
ing the problem — who are the adversaries, who are the tar-
gets, what are the techniques used, and why are they effec-
tive — is crucial for ultimately developing effective defenses.
2.2.1 Ecosystem Studies
A number of academic studies have now examined various
aspects of the mis/disinformation ecosystem. Many of these
studies are case studies focusing on a particular issue, cam-
paign, or time span (e.g., [4, 40, 92]). Some more general
studies or surveys exist as well (e.g., [63, 97, 115]). We sum-
marize some of the key findings from this work here.
Techniques. One repeated theme in this research is that
sources of mis/disinformation rely on a range of techniques
in terms of sophistication. For example, a study of dis-
information campaigns embedded in Twitter conversations
around Black Lives Matter suggested that social media
accounts that spread mis/disinformation range from low-
effort spambots, to slightly more human-seeming, semi-
automated accounts with some degree of human supervi-
sion, to purely human-run accounts that build large fol-
lowings before exploiting the trust of those social links to
spread mis/disinformation widely [4]. Supporting these re-
sults more broadly, Marwick et al. [63] provide a partial sur-
vey of groups and movements that have been particularly ef-
fective in manipulating the media to spread their messages,
using methods such as: impersonation of activists to exploit
the trust aspect of social networks, bot promotion of a story
on social media, and government-funded media outlets.
Structure. Understanding how mis/disinformation content
or information ecosystems differ from other information
ecosystems can potentially help detect them. For example, a
study of alternate news media coverage of the Syrian White
Helmets found that these media often copy content without
attribution; clusters of sources which shared articles reveal
a densely-linked alternative media cluster which is largely
disconnected from reputable news media [92].
Consumers. In addition to understanding disinformation
campaigns, ecosystems studies can help us understand the
behaviors of human consumers. For example, a study of the
geographic and temporal trends of fake news consumption
during the 2016 U.S. election found a correlation of aggre-
gate voting behavior with consumption of fake news across
states [40] (though the causality is, of course, unclear).
More generally, evidence suggests [97] that users base
their trust in an article on their trust of the friend who they
saw share it, i.e., information local to them, rather than the
source or upstream links in the chain of shares. Further,
people mistakenly believe that they take the trustworthiness
of the source into account more than they actually do [63].
On some platforms, design choices mean that messages may
spread in a way that obscures the source (e.g., WhatsApp) or
conceals intermediate links in the chain between source and
sharer (e.g., Twitter). These design choices may contribute
to the spread of mis/disinformation and can make it difficult
for external researchers to study the ecosystem.
2.2.2 Tools for Measurement
A major challenge in conducting measurement studies of
mis/disinformation, or of attempting to counter it by fact-
checking individual stories, is that it requires significant
manual effort. To help with this process, several tools — for
researchers, journalists, and/or end users — have been devel-
oped to surface the sources and trajectories of shared content
or to facilitate fact checking directly.
For example, Hoaxy [71] is a tool that collects and tracks
mis/disinformation and corresponding fact checking efforts
on Twitter. A study by its creators [84] found that, per-
haps unsurprisingly, fact checking content is shared signif-
icantly less than the original article. In another study [85],
its creators used Hoaxy to demonstrate the central role of so-
cial spambots in the mis/disinformation ecosystem — a valu-
able conclusion, as it suggests that curbing these bots may
be crucial in the fight against mis/disinformation (see Sec-
tion 2.3.3).
TwitterTrails [38] is a related tool that provides informa-
tion regarding the origin, burst characteristics, and propaga-
tion of content on Twitter. The resulting visualizations are
intended to help users to investigate the veracity of the con-
tent. Hamilton 68 [1] similarly provides a dashboard of in-
formation about Russian influence operations on Twitter.
Challenges. Though valuable to helping us understand the
broader ecosystem, none of these tools is yet a silver bullet.
Some (e.g., TwitterTrails and Emergent [87], a seemingly
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discontinued real-time rumor tracker) suffer from being in-
sufficiently automated. Additionally, in some cases, it is not
directly clear how the surfaced information should be used
by researchers or end users, and worse, may be misunder-
stood [2]. Finally, these tools are all targeted at Twitter be-
cause of its public nature; closed platforms like Facebook
do not support similar efforts. These limitations are not due
to the lack of effort or intention by the tools’ creators but
rather due to fundamental challenges. Mis/disinformation
campaigns vary widely in their techniques, automatically de-
tecting “fake news” is hard (as discussed below), humans
suffer from fundamental cognitive biases, and while know-
ing the source and trajectory of content can help shed light
on the dynamics of the ecosystem, measurement may not di-
rectly provide a solution. Nevertheless, such tools are a valu-
able component of a defender’s toolbox.
2.3 Enabling Technologies
We now turn to several key enabling technologies that under-
lie the recent rise of mis/disinformation at scale: extremely
realistic and easy-to-create false video (Section 2.3.1), in-
dividualized tracking of a user’s browsing behaviors and
hyper-personal targeting of content based on the results of
this tracking (Section 2.3.2), and social media bots (Sec-
tion 2.3.3).
2.3.1 False Video
False media has existed for as long as there has been me-
dia to falsify: forgers have faked documents or works of art,
teenagers have faked driver’s licenses, etc. With the advent
of digital media, the problem has been amplified, with tools
like Photoshop making it easy for relatively unskilled actors
to perform sophisticated alterations to photographs. More
recently, developments in AI have extended that capability
to permit the creation of realistic false video.
The most popular technique to produce photorealistic false
video is the reanimation of faces. In a typical setup, a tar-
get video, such as an announcement by a politician, is rean-
imated to show the same sequence of facial expressions as a
source video, such as a political opponent sitting in front of
a webcam in their living room. Usually the reanimation pro-
cess is implemented with generative adversarial networks,
and a significant amount of training data may be required.
The resulting false video is often referred to as a “deepfake”.
Instantiations. Various implementations exist in the litera-
ture and publicly on the internet. The Face2Face tool, pub-
lished in 2016 [98], is an early example of real-time facial
reenactment. In 2017, the term “deepfake” went public on
reddit, along with the FakeApp tool [48, 111]. The Deep
Video Portraits project significantly refined the process in
2018 [51], requiring only a few minutes of video of the tar-
get to create a realistic real-time reanimation. Other work
from 2017 [95] allows the reanimation to be automatically
derived from an audio stream, without the need for a source
video (but with the need for significant training video data of
the target, e.g., Obama).
Implications. Synthetic, photorealistic video is hardly new,
but historically it has been prohibitively expensive to pro-
duce, limiting its appearance to scenarios like special effects
in movies. Tools like FakeApp democratize this capability,
making it possible for individuals to create similarly high-
quality synthetic video in a restrictive but growing set of
cases. And we can only expect synthetic video technology
to improve, given its importance in the entertainment indus-
try, from video games to Snapchat filters. In spite of its
entertainment value, the increasing prevalence of synthetic
video can have negative effects on our information ecosys-
tem, from spreading mis/disinformation to undermining the
credibility of legitimate information (allowing anyone to ar-
gue that anything has been faked).
2.3.2 Tracking and Targeting
The economic model of today’s web is based on advertis-
ing: users receive content for “free” in exchange for see-
ing advertisements. To optimize these advertisements, they
are increasingly targeted at specific consumers; to enable
this targeting, widespread and sophisticated tracking of user
browser behaviors has been developed. These technologies
of tracking and targeted can be leveraged not only by legit-
imate traditional advertisers but also by entities wishing to
spread mis/disinformation for monetary gain (e.g., viral con-
tent to maximize clicks) as well as directly malicious pur-
poses (e.g., affecting the outcome of an election).
Tracking. There has been significant prior work studying
tracking and targeting within the computer security and pri-
vacy community, which we very briefly summarize here.
At the highest level, so-called third party tracking is the
practice by which companies embed content — like adver-
tising networks, social media widgets, and website analytics
scripts — in the first party sites that users visit directly. This
embedding relationship allows the third party to re-identify
users across different websites and build a browsing his-
tory. In addition to traditional browser cookie based track-
ing [56, 79], tracking also manifests itself in browser finger-
printing, which relies on browser-specific and OS-specific
features and quirks to get a fingerprint of a user’s browser
that can be used to correlate the user’s visits across web-
sites [21, 69]. Though tracking can be used for legitimate
purposes — e.g., preventing fraudulent purchases or provid-
ing more personalized content — there have been increasing
concerns about its privacy implications (e.g., as evidenced
by the General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR, in the
EU). At present, though a number of anti-tracking browsers,
browser extensions, other tools exist (e.g., [8, 19, 41, 100]),
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there exists no fully reliable way for users to avoid tracking.
Targeting. Tracking can be and often is ultimately lever-
aged to target particular content at a user, e.g., via adver-
tisements on Facebook or embedded in other websites (e.g.,
news sites). Researchers have found that even when adver-
tising platforms like Facebook provide some transparency
for users about why certain ads are targeted at them, the in-
formation provided is overly broad and vague [3], failing to
improve users’ understanding of why they are seeing some-
thing or what the platform knows about them [22]. The act
of targeting itself can raise privacy concerns, because it can
allow potentially malicious advertisers to extract private in-
formation about users stored in advertising platforms (like
Facebook) [31, 105, 106]; it can also be used to intention-
ally or unintentionally target individuals based on sensitive
attributes (e.g., health issues) [55]. These very ecosystems,
which underlie the economic model of today’s web and thus
cannot be easily displaced, can be directly exploited by disin-
formation campaigns to target specific vulnerable users and
to create and leverage filter bubbles.
2.3.3 Social Bots
A common tactic seen in recent disinformation campaigns is
the use of social media bots to amplify low-credibility con-
tent to give the false impression of significant support or in-
terest [36, 85], or to fan the flames of partisan debate [4].
Indeed, bot accounts are common on social media platforms.
Some studies estimate that as of 2017, up to 15% of Twit-
ter accounts are bots [104]; Twitter itself recently suspended
bot accounts, resulting in a cumulative 6% drop of followers
across the platform [12].
Bot behaviors. Researchers have characterized the evolu-
tion of bots over time, referring to the recent iteration as “so-
cial spambots” [36]. Earlier spambots used simplistic tech-
niques — such as tweeting spam links at many different ac-
counts [13] — that were relatively easy to detect. By con-
trast, social spambots use increasingly sophisticated tech-
niques to post context-relevant content based on the commu-
nity they are attempting to blend into. These bots slowly
build trust and credible profiles within online communi-
ties [36]. They then either programmatically or manually
(via a human operator, in a human-bot combination some-
times called a “cyborg” [104]) disseminate false news and
extremist perspectives in order to sow distrust and division
among human users [4]. Social bots have shown to be ef-
fective at swaying online discussion as well as inflating the
amount of support for various political campaigns and social
movements [36, 85].
Detection and measurement. Characterizing bot interac-
tions and measuring the social bot ecosystem are critical
steps towards being able to detect and eliminate malicious
bots. Research into bot ecosystems has found, for example,
that unsophisticated bots interact with sophisticated bots to
give the sophisticated bots more credibility [104], and that
accounts spreading articles from low-credibility sources are
more likely to be bots [85].
Various efforts have been made to detect and combat so-
cial bots online — a nice summary is written by Ferrara et
al. [36]. Detection approaches commonly leverage machine
learning to find differences between human users and bot ac-
counts. Detection models make use of the social network
graph structure, account data and posting metrics, as well as
natural language processing techniques to analyze the text
content from profiles. Crowdsourcing techniques have also
been attempted [108]. From the platform provider’s vantage
point, a promising approach relies on monitoring account
behaviour such as time spent viewing posts and number of
friend requests sent [112].
Challenges. Multiple challenges arise in the fight against
malicious social bots. First, some bots are benign or bene-
ficial [36, 82], such as bots that help with news aggregation
and disaster relief coordination. More generally, using ma-
chine learning to detect social bots can be challenging due to
the lack of ground truth and real world training data, espe-
cially since some bots or cyborgs can evade detection even
by human evaluators [13]. Ultimately, bot detection is a clas-
sic arms race between attackers and defenders [13].
Another challenge is the potential misalignment of incen-
tives: by identifying and banning bot accounts, social media
platforms risk depressing their valuations when it becomes
clear that the number of legitimate users is lower than pre-
viously believed [12, 81]. This incentive problem is in ten-
sion with the fact that platforms themselves have the best
visibility into accounts behaviors that can be effective in de-
tection [112]. Indeed, most academic bot detection work is
centered on Twitter, as other platforms are much more diffi-
cult to study from an external perspective.
Finally, the current mis/disinformation problem is not
solely the result of bots; as we have seen, some disinforma-
tion campaigns involve sophisticated human operators [4],
and the advertising-based economic model of the web en-
courages clickbait-style content more generally.
2.4 Technical Defenses
Finally, we summarize existing technical efforts on defend-
ing against mis/disinformation, either by attempting to detect
it directly (Section 2.4.1) and/or by changing the user expe-
rience in an information platform (Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Fake News Detection
One approach for combating mis/disinformation is to di-
rectly tackle the problem as such: detecting fake or mislead-
ing news. Such detection could enable (1) social platforms to
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reduce the spread and influence of fake news, and (2) readers
to select reliable sources of information.
Fake news detection is a space where it is tempting to
try to just “throw some machine learning at the problem”
(e.g., [18, 73]). However, our exploration of the space sug-
gests that breaking fake news detection down into more care-
fully defined sub-problems may be more realistic and mean-
ingful at this point.
Definition. To detect fake news, we first need a formal, well-
defined notion of what is “fake”. A variety of definitions ex-
ist in the literature, depending on factors such as whether the
facts are verifiably false and whether the publisher’s intent
is malicious [86], and including definitions that include or
exclude satire, propaganda, and hoaxes [80]. A commonly
used definition [32, 86] of fake news in the context of to-
day’s mis/disinformation discussions is information that is
both (1) factually false and (2) intentionally misleading.
Fake news detection as a unified task. At first blush, one
might approach the problem of fake news detection as a uni-
fied task. With machine learning, it is possible to directly
train end-to-end models using labeled data (both fake and
non-fake articles) [73]. The accessibility of machine learning
tools creates a low barrier for attempting this technique [18].
However, posing the problem generally in this way comes
with pitfalls. First, it requires large amounts of labeled ex-
amples which can be costly to obtain; past work has used
examples from Politifact [75, 109] and Emergent [37, 87] as
data sources instead. Additionally, many of these systems
are based on neural networks, which lack explanations for
their output and therefore make it hard to understand why
they do or do not do well, and result in limited usefulness in
downstream tasks. Biases in the datasets used can also trans-
late to hidden biases in the classifier, affecting performance
when used in real-world situations.
Subtask: Detecting factual inaccuracies. More effective,
particularly from the perspective of advancing the underly-
ing state of the art in natural language processing or related
fields, is to solve well-defined sub-problems of fake news
detection. One such sub-problem is detecting factual inaccu-
racies and falsehoods, by examining and verifying the facts
in the content of the article based on external evidence.
A common method deployed in practice is to use experts
(fact-checkers) to manually extract the facts and validate
each one using any tools necessary (including actively con-
ducting research); examples include Snopes [90] and Politi-
fact [75]. There are also some platforms which use volunteer
crowd work to evaluate evidence, for educational purposes
(e.g., Mind Over Media [65]) or to maintain veracity of a
resource (e.g., Wikipedia).
Using humans to fact-check is, of course, time-consuming
and expensive. Automated knowledge-based verification ex-
ists but is not yet practical, because it is difficult to formalize
claims from natural language, and knowledge bases are in-
complete and inflexible with novel information. Recent work
has thus focused on even further sub-problems, such as iden-
tifying if a claim is backed up by given sources [15, 99, 107]
or using unstructured external web information [76]. For ex-
ample, the Fake News Challenge [32, 44] focused on a stance
detection sub-problem (based on a prior dataset [37]) that
involves estimating whether a given text agrees, disagrees,
discusses, or is unrelated to a headline.
Subtask: Detecting misleading style. Another sub-
problem of identifying fake news is to infer the intent of the
article by analyzing its style [109]. For example, attempts
at deception may be found through identifying manipulative
wording or weasel words [66, 78], examining the tone of
voice (such as identification of clickbait titles), and gauging
author inclinations [60] and stance [15, 37]. Earlier work on
deception detection (e.g., [66]) is also relevant. All of these
analyses can be done with either trained human experts or
through machine learning models. While writing style offers
a strong hint of an author’s intent, an absence of manipulative
style of writing does not imply good intentions. Conversely,
manipulative styles of writing may be associated with other
related phenomena, such as hyper-partisanship [77], rather
than fake news directly.
Subtask: Analyzing metadata. Other work has focused on
analyzing article metadata rather than article content. For
example, when social features, such as shares and likes, are
available, they can be used to infer the intent of a collective
group. Social features that have been explored include in-
formation about the connectivity of the social graph between
users, known attributes and profile of the sharer, and the path
of propagation of information [58, 60, 92, 96].
Challenges. While there is promise in automating fake
news detection, there are also possible pitfalls. First, natu-
ral (skewed) distribution of fake news can lead to misleading
performance numbers of detection systems, as noted in the
Fake News Challenge [32] postmortem [44]. Increasing ac-
cessibility of machine learning tools coupled with lack of
understanding during evaluation can lead to deployment of
systems that are not sufficiently accurate in practice and may
have unintended consequences. Secondly, bad actors may
be able to leverage fake news detection approaches to create
better fake content (as in a generative adversarial network, or
GAN), though such an arms race is likely inevitable.
Finally, fake news detection alone, even if done perfectly,
does not guarantee a defense against mis/disinformation —
humans have psychological and cognitive patterns that deter-
mine how we actually utilize the information obtained from
detection. For example, the backfire effect [59, 70] suggests
that giving people evidence that something they believe is
false can backfire, leading them to believe it more strongly.
Thus, an open but important question is: how should the re-
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sults of fake news detection best be incorporated into tools
or interfaces for end users?
2.4.2 UI/UX Interventions
Researchers and social media platforms have proposed
user experience interventions to help users detect online
mis/disinformation and reduce the rate at which it spreads.
Some of these changes have already been deployed to users,
as we describe here. However, it is unclear to the research
community whether these interventions have been effective.
Labeling potential mis/disinformation. One approach is to
use the output of fake news detection or similar classifica-
tions in order to label low-credibility content. For example,
in 2017, Facebook experimented with labeling news articles
as “disputed” if they were believed false; however this ap-
proach was abandoned, as Facebook learned from academics
that this does not change people’s minds [29]. Instead, Face-
book began showing “related” articles [27], which may in-
clude articles from fact-checking sites like Snopes [90].
More information for users. Because it is difficult to defini-
tively detect mis/disinformation, and because it can be inef-
fective to surface this fact to users directly, a common strat-
egy is to simply provide more information to users to help
them make their own determination. Facebook’s related ar-
ticles feature [27] is one example. Other examples from
Facebook include more prominently labeling political ads
and their funders [30] and providing users with more context
about shared articles [26]. And because hoaxes on What-
sapp have been increasingly shared via forwarded messages,
in July 2018, Whatsapp began displaying “Forwarded” be-
fore such messages to help users understand that the message
may not have been written by the immediate sender [45].
Third-party tools also exist. For example, the SurfSafe
browser extension [53, 94] can help users identify doctored
images by showing them other websites that the image has
been found in — so if an image appears newsworthy, but
does not appear in any mainstream news sites, users could
interpret it as being faked. SurfSafe also highlights whether
an image also appears on fact checking sites. The InVID
browser extension [47] is a set of tools for helping peo-
ple investigate online content, like stepping frame by frame
through videos, reverse image searches, viewing photo/video
metadata, and other forensic analysis tools.
User education. Another approach Facebook has tried is
educating users about how to detect misinformation, and dis-
playing related articles to push users to better educate them-
selves. In April 2017, Facebook began showing a post ti-
tled “Tips for spotting false news” the top of users’ news
feeds, which linked to a page about basic principles of on-
line news literacy, like identifying sources, looking for dis-
crepancies in the URL and formatting, and looking at multi-
ple sources [24, 25]. Facebook’s related article feature [27]
can also encourage reading articles from multiple sources
about controversial topics. Outside of Facebook, researchers
have proposed, for example, adding “nutritional labels” for
news articles to indicate to users which sources are “healthy”
and “unhealthy”, like mainstream news versus clickbait [83].
These labels would display “health” metrics like the publi-
cation’s slant, the tone of the content, the timeliness of the
article, and the experience of the author.
Limiting the spread of mis/disinformation. The designs of
different social media platforms may encourage the spread
of mis/disinformation, e.g., by rewarding attention-grabbing
posts. Social media platforms have started making changes
to their core product to make it less easy to disseminate
mis/disinformation. Twitter is considering removing or re-
designing the (heart-shaped) “like” button, because they are
concerned that the incentive to accumulate likes also en-
courages bad behaviors, which could include spreading sen-
sationalist mis/disinformation [17]. Facebook has made
changes to its news feed algorithm to downweight “click-
bait” posts that abuse sharing mechanisms to reach a larger
audience, such as “share if x”, or “tag a friend that x” [28].
This change removes one mechanism that accounts that
spread mis/disinformation could use to reach audiences be-
yond their direct friends and followers.
Challenges. It is difficult to conduct research on UI/UX in-
terventions, especially for academics, because many critical
parts of the research require cooperation from the social me-
dia platforms, such as deploying interventions at scale, and
measuring the effects of an intervention in the wild. While
Facebook and others have made blog posts about the changes
they have made, these posts are not scientifically rigorous
and detailed enough to be replicable or generalizable. So-
cial media platforms may also be reluctant to work with re-
searchers or experiment with interventions if these conflict
or do not align with their business interests.
Another challenge is that interventions may depend on the
accurate identification of mis/disinformation or untrustwor-
thy sources. Doing so automatically remains a significant
challenge (as discussed in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.1), so de-
fenses like the nutritional labels and SurfSafe still rely on
human raters to identify false information.
3 Discussion
We now step back from our exploration and summary of the
mis/disinformation landscape, and the role of technology in
that landscape, to consider first the broader lessons we, as
a group, took away from this exploration. We then make
recommendations for a variety of stakeholders.
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3.1 Lessons
Disinformation stems from a variety of motivations
and adversarial goals, which may necessitate different
solutions. There are many different manifestations of
mis/disinformation, and many different actor incentives and
intentions [110]. Thus, different solutions may be required
for different actors or manifestations. For example, actors
with financial incentives may share disinformation to in-
crease click-through profitability, as in the case of Facebook
clickbait [28] or fake news enterprises in Macedonia [88].
Identifying this motive enables combating it by demonetiz-
ing these behaviors (e.g., limiting the spread of clickbait [28]
or erecting barriers in the form of increased manual re-
view [30]). By contrast, state-level actors seeking a political
outcome will not be so easily dissuaded; instead, a defen-
sive goal here may be to improve detection and attribution
capabilities in order to be able to provide evidence in an in-
ternational court of law.
Defining the problem is not always straightforward.
Given the complexity of this space, the line of what behavior
or content is “bad” is not necessarily clear or easy to define.
Work attempting to combat the issue, e.g., by automatically
detecting fake news, should carefully define what the prob-
lem is, e.g., what is meant by “fake news” — and reflect on
what these definitions are useful for (and whether they are
useful in practice). Moreover, asking platform operators to
moderate content is challenging, because in many cases it
may be hard to draw a clear line. (There are exceptions, e.g.,
human rights atrocities [67].)
Solutions can and will not just be technical. The motiva-
tions, forms, and methods for spreading mis/disinformation
are diverse, complicated and evolving; automated ap-
proaches for detecting it seem insufficient. Moreoever,
mis/disinformation exploits underlying human congitive vul-
nerabilities. Thus, we cannot just “throw some machine
learning” at the problem but must consider more holistic ap-
proaches. That said, some promising technical approaches
do exist and should be further researched and implemented.
We make some recommendations in the next section.
The disinformation problem is an arms race, and an
asymmetrical battle between attackers and defenders.
Mis/disinformation is a difficult problem to fight because it
is a highly asymmetrical battle. Like insurgents, spreaders
of online disinformation have a wide variety of established
targets to attack and the freedom to appear, test new strate-
gies, and disappear again with minimal cost and few reper-
cussions. Meanwhile, defenders like fact-checkers have a
much more difficult task ahead of them, that is both hard
to define and often contrary to people’s cognitive biases. In
such a complicated space, it may be unsurprising that we
cannot indiscriminately point technology at the problem and
make it go away; what is worrying, though, is that it seems
to be very easy for adversaries to indiscriminately use tech-
nology and make it much worse.
Current adversaries are already sophisticated, and
can/will become more so; but they also use simple yet
effective techniques. A number of case studies show how
sophisticated disinformation campaigns already are in some
cases, e.g., creating targeted content for each group of
users that resonates with their opinions [4]. Disinformation
is becoming more realistic, more personalized, and more
widespread — including convincing fake videos and social
media personas. At the same time, sometimes the most ef-
fective disinformation is not at all sophisticated in terms of
technology. For example, complex deep learning video edit-
ing techniques are not required for simple edited photos that
effectively spread virally (e.g., a fake photo of an NFL player
burning an American flag [61]). However, like spear phish-
ing [34] in the computer security domain, such simple tech-
niques must be taken seriously. Additionally, the simplic-
ity of some of the known techniques — like copying article
text [92] — contributes to the impression that this is an arms
race, and detecting disinformation now will not mean we can
detect disinformation tomorrow.
Incentives of platforms, and even users themselves, are
often not aligned with combating mis/disinformation. It
is difficult to credibly make recommendations to platform
designers that are employed by for-profit companies: these
companies (and by extension, the designers) may priori-
tize profit if it conflicts with combating mis/disinformation.
This concern is not just academic: Facebook’s and Twitter’s
user numbers, for example, may directly impact their valu-
ations [12, 81], reducing the incentive to separate legitimate
from illegitimate users. Though these platforms are not de-
signed to intentionally support mis/disinformation, often de-
sign choices interact badly with human cognitive biases. We
discuss this issue further in our recommendations below.
Solutions should be careful about the risk of causing peo-
ple to be overly skeptical and distrust everything. Sowing
distrust and undermining institutions is a key goal of some
disinformation campaigns, and solutions must be careful not
to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” — that is, users
must be taught to and supported in building (legitimate) trust,
not just skepticism.
There may be lessons to apply from traditional computer
security. For example, lessons from usable security suggest
that interrupting users and asking them to make decisions
about what is good or bad is not, in and of itself, an effec-
tive strategy [113]. As another example, the best technical
systems can be undermined by targeted spear phishing at-
tacks [34], targeting human cognitive vulnerabilities.
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3.2 Recommendations
Finally, we surface our recommendations, organized by
stakeholder.
3.2.1 Recommendations for Technologists and Other
Defenders
Be specific about the goals that a particular technical so-
lution is intending to achieve. If one’s goal is to solve a
problem, then one should focus on the goal, not the technol-
ogy used to solve it. A good goal is both useful and pos-
sible to achieve. A useful example is the work of Starbird
et al. [92], which identified a useful task (investigating the
ecosystem) and published valuable data and insights as a re-
sult. Another possibly instructive comparison is between the
Fake News Challenge [44], which pushed forward the state
of the art on a specific problem (stance detection) and other,
more general attempts at fake news detection with machine
learning [18, 73], whose general applicability and ultimately
effectiveness may be limited.
Do work on solving technology-related sub-problems.
Though technology alone cannot solve the whole problem,
as discussed, there are technology-related sub-problems that
are useful. Example technology-based directions to investi-
gate (though not an exhaustive list) may include:
• False news detection based on precise definitions of
useful, solvable sub-problems; combining these sub-
problems into a larger detection pipeline; and leverag-
ing the results of this detection (e.g., to measure ecosys-
tems or effectively surface information to end users).
• “Chain of custody” approaches for information. For ex-
ample, for photos, see ProofMode [42], TruePic [101],
and PhotoProof [68].
• Platform-based or other UI/UX interventions: both for-
mative research to understand what is (not) effective
and how existing designs drive user behaviors, and de-
veloping and evaluating new designs.
• Continued work on bot detection and characterization,
and on strategies for user verification.
Continue measurement studies to understand the ecosys-
tem. Successful defenses require a deep understanding of
the underlying ecosystems creating, spreading, and reacting
to mis/disinformation.
Tailor solutions to specific types of users, content, and/or
adversaries. Different parts of the space may necessitate
different solutions, as discussed above.
Consider what alternate incentive or monetary struc-
tures for the web might be, and how to make those a
reality. The financial incentives driving platform providers
and many adversaries are also core to the functioning of
the modern web, e.g., the supporting of free content and
services via targeted advertisements. Though challenging,
we must consider alternate models that will de-incentivize
financially-based mis/disinformation and better align the in-
centives of platform providers, users, content creators, and
mis/disinformation defenders.
Invest in and study user education efforts. Skills like
critical thinking and the ability to fact check are good de-
fenses against mis/disinformation in general, but applying
them becomes more challenging as technology enables more
sophisticated and subtle mis/disinformation. We should ex-
plore how to effectively teach users how current technologies
could be exploited, and how to spot these issues. For exam-
ple, this could include:
• Teaching users to spot ads versus organic content.
• Teaching users to be aware of what technology is capa-
ble of (e.g., screenshots can be easily fabricated, fake
portraits and videos made, accounts hacked).
• Teaching users to look for markers of bot accounts and
low-credibility stories and sources.
• Teaching users to spot mis/disinformation via a game.
• Balancing teaching skepticism with teaching how to
build up knowledge. The end goal should not be for
users to simply distrust everything.
• Bringing discussions of this topic and possible inter-
ventions into the “public square”, such as via television
shows. There may be models for this type of engage-
ment and/or lessons to learn from other attempts, such
as the Latvian “Theory of Lies” show on uncovering
disinformation [23] or the bilingual “StopFake” show
in the Ukraine [93].
We also recommend following a scientific process to develop
and evaluate educational interventions. Researchers and oth-
ers should test and evaluate which specific educational inter-
ventions actually have a positive effect.
Avoid placing too much burden on users. Though educa-
tion and surfacing more information to users can be a part of
the solution, it can certainly not be the entire solution. Tak-
ing lessons from, for example, the usable computer security
community (e.g., [113]), solutions that increase the burden
on the user and get in the way of a user’s primary task (in this
case, interacting with their social network and consuming in-
formation) may be circumvented, ignored, and/or ultimately
ineffective. Thus, user education must be complemented by
other interventions discussed elsewhere in this section.
Consider all users. We need to develop solutions for every-
one and not only the technically literate 1%. Fact-checking
tools and UI interventions only work if people actually use
them. Thus, for example, browser extensions or other solu-
tions that require users to go out of their way will have lim-
ited reach. As a result, some burden may be on social media
platform designers, news sites and aggregators, and browser
vendors themselves to consider what UI/UX interventions
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may benefit all users. We discuss specific suggestions for
(particularly social media) platform designers in the next
section. Additionally, different geographic or demographic
user groups may interact differently with mis/disinformation
and interventions.
3.2.2 Recommendations for Platform Designers
Acknowledge that platform designs are not neutral. De-
signers should recognize that some design patterns (while
useful for user engagement) could have unintended conse-
quences and leave openings for mis/disinformation. Most
prominently, patterns for generating revenue (tracking, ad
targeting, and so on) can and are misused by malicious par-
ties. As another example, Twitter’s emphasis on a username
instead of the unique “@handle” enables attacks in which
compromised “verified” accounts can be used to masquer-
ade as other prominent users [46]. Platform designers are in
a unique position to directly influence the mis/disinformation
landscape. Some concrete recommendations for changes to
investigate:
• Platforms should examine their design affordances and
study their role in mis/disinformation. For example,
consider some of the social signals that their platforms
introduce, such as likes, shares, and the selection of
comments shown. In their current form, while they
show what is popular, these UI features also confer
credibility and encourage the spread of falsehoods and
propaganda. Some platforms have already begun to
make changes to these features, though their impacts
are not publicly known.
• Platforms should be more thoughtful about their recom-
mender algorithms, and continue to find ways to down-
weight content that is extreme and misleading.
• Platforms should continue to provide users with more
information and more (genuine) transparency about, for
example, the sources of information, the reasons for
why certain content is targeted at a user, and which con-
tent is sponsored versus organic. Prior works suggests
that existing efforts to disclose and label advertisements
is ineffective (e.g., [64]).
• Consider how identity is handled on the platform.
Though there is value in places on the web where things
can be shared anonymously, its use — and how illegiti-
mate accounts are identified and handled — should be
considered carefully. As a cautionary tale, consider
how easily Russian actors impersonated members of the
Black Lives Matter movement [4]. One possible miti-
gation to study is a design where posts from untrusted,
anonymous sources are not intermingled with content
authored directly by accounts known to a user.
• More generally, platform designers should try to shift
the incentives of their organizations to treat combating
mis/disinformation as a higher high priority than some
reports suggest it is today (e.g., [57]), recognizing that
this phenomenon, if unaddressed, could ultimately pose
an existential threats to these platforms.
Provide ways for users/researchers/others to understand
and evaluate what is going on in the platform. One pos-
sibility may be teaming up with researchers to experiment
with and understand the effects of each feature, both good
and bad. Some such efforts already exist, such as Facebook
providing data to researchers via SocialScienceOne [91].
3.2.3 Recommendations for Researchers
Make the results of research in this space accessible to
and digestible by the general public. We know there is a
problem. Research, such as that summarized in Section 2.2,
clearly documents the problem. And the results of this re-
search needs to continue to move out of academia to the gen-
eral public, to support broader discussion and awareness.
Think critically about the technologies we develop and
how they might be misused. While technologies help en-
able mis/disinformation, most of them are designed with cer-
tain other motivations. For instance, tracking and targeting is
primarily for personalization, computer-generated video im-
proves the quality of post-production, and bots can also be
benign. We, as researchers, must acknowledge that techno-
logical advances have also enabled the creation and spread
of mis/disinformation at a massive scale. When developing
a system or technology, we must assume bad actors will at-
tempt to exploit or otherwise take advantage of these sys-
tems; pretending that people will not misuse technologies,
e.g., manipulate videos for propaganda purposes, is naive.
Collaborate across fields to understand and address the
problem. It is critical that researchers from multiple
(sub)fields, including cognitive science, computer security,
behavioral sciences, game theory, human-computer interac-
tion, information science, journalism, law, machine learning,
natural language processing, neurology, psychology, sociol-
ogy, and others work together to understand and address this
problem. Otherwise proposed solutions risk being ineffec-
tive due to an incomplete understanding of the issues. For
example, formulating defenses against mis/disinformation as
a supervised binary classification problem may have ma-
jor limitations in practice — e.g., due to the backfire ef-
fect [70, 70], flagging content as fake can make users more
likely to believe it, not less. Instead, detection, preven-
tion, and defense against mis/disinformation is an interdis-
ciplinary research problem.
Study different groups of users.. Researchers should work
to understand how the effect of mis/disinformation and ef-
fective offensive/defensive strategies may differ between dif-
ferent users groups. As with different adversarial motiva-
tions, different approaches may be needed for different users.
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Foundational science is still needed to understand these po-
tential differences and their impacts.
3.2.4 Recommendations for Policymakers
Consider policies or regulations that might help align
the incentives of platform developers to combating the
mis/disinformation problem. Making recommendations to
policymakers was not the goal of our investigation, so we
do not intend to present a complete list here. However, as
we often came up against the tensions between the web’s
economic model (via advertisements) and the viability of
possible platform-based interventions to limit the spread of
mis/disinformation, we felt this point was important to men-
tion. We suggest that policymakers should consider their po-
tential role in helping reshape the incentive structures that
lead to this tension — for example, in regulating how users’
data can be used for targeting or how platforms should re-
spond to known disinformation campaigns.
Ground policy proposals in technical realities. At the
same time, we caution that policymakers should ground their
proposals in a solid understanding of the underlying tech-
nologies. For example, a proposed U.S. Senate bill intend-
ing to regulate bots by requiring them to self-identify (and
platform providers to enforce it) [35] suffers from an impre-
cise definition of bot [52] and may be technically challeng-
ing or impossible to enforce, sweep up legitimate users or
use cases, fail to positively affect end user behaviors even
if enforced, and may thus ultimately burden platforms and
users without having the intended benefits.
3.2.5 Recommendations for Users
Additional and more comprehensive recommendations for
users can be found online (e.g., [11, 24, 103, 114]). We focus
briefly on several high-level recommendations.
Be skeptical of content you see on the web. Content from
unknown sources, or that seems suspicious or particularly
dramatic or too good or bad to be true, should be taken
with a healthy dose of skepticism. Even further considera-
tion should be taken before sharing such content with others.
Be aware that even “trusted” sources of information can re-
share mis/disinformation; your friends may inadvertently do
so, and not all platforms surface information about the orig-
inal source (e.g., forwarded messages on WhatsApp). Look
for corroborating or conflicting evidence from other sources,
and be open to changing your mind.
At the same time, don’t assume everything is false just
because it can be false. Undermining the legitimacy of in-
stitutions like journalism is a key goal of some disinforma-
tion campaigns. Use strategies to build your trust in content:
for example, try to identify the original sources, go directly
to news sources you trust, and seek out a diversity of sources.
Be aware of your own possible cognitive biases and try
to spot when they are being exploited. For example, be
cautious if something makes you angry and confirms your
existing view about a person or issue. An instructive list of
cognitive biases can be found in the references [89].
4 Conclusion
The current ecosystem of technology-enabled mis- and dis-
information has potentially serious and far-reaching conse-
quences. As technologists, it is critical that we understand
the potential and actual negative impacts and misuses of the
technologies we create; that we deploy defensive technolo-
gies at aimed at specific, achievable goals; and that we col-
laborate with other fields to fully understand the problem and
solution space. We have compiled this report, the result of an
academic quarter’s investigation into the mis/disinformation
landscape from the perspective of a graduate special topics
course in computer science, in the hopes that the interested
reader will benefit from our summaries, lessons, and recom-
mendations. Further efforts from researchers, technologists,
platform designers, educators, policymakers, and others are
required to study and combat both intentional disinformation
and unintentional misinformation. Ultimately this is not a
problem that can be eliminated completely — the underlying
human cognitive biases and their exploitation for persuasion,
both good and bad, long predate the technologies discussed
in this report. But that does not mean that we should throw
up our hands and avoid thinking critically about how to im-
prove the information ecosystems that we use and build.
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